Lecture | Information Systems

Auction Theory and Market Design


Game-theoretical solution concepts, mechanism design, single-item auction theory, combinatorial auctions, assignment markets, iterative combinatorial auctions, combinatorial clock auctions, approximation mechanisms, matching markets.

Learning outcomes

After successful completion of the module, students are aware of gametheoretical solution concepts such as Nash equilibria or Bayes-Nash equilibria. They are able to understand the theoretical background of auction models such as the independen private values model. Students understand the computational hardness of allocation problems in multiobject auctions and know optimization models used in combinatorial and other multi-object auctions. Students understand when auction formats satisfy strong game-theoretical solution concepts where bidders have strong incentives to bid truthfully. They understand design desiderata in auction design and learn about the properties of auction formats as they are being used in the field. Most allocation problems in multi-object markets are computationally hard, such that students will also learn about approximation algorithms which solve the problem in polynomial time, but are truthful for bidders.